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This paper supposes that an individual caree abont his own wealth not only directly
but also via the relative standing this wealth inducea in the wealth distribution. The
implications of this second effect for risk-taking aze investigated in particular. Such a
model indeed provides a very natural explanation of the "concave-~onvex-concave" utility
described by Friedman and Savage. The etatus interaction effect here involves an
externality, the full treatment of which requires a discussion of Pazeto efficiency. It is
shown that a certain limited kind of gambling is needed in order to attain the entire utility
possibility frontier and, indeed, that it is not true that any deterministic wealth
distribution is always Pazeto~fficient. It is now ehown that banning individually rational
gambling will generally raise welfaze when the original distribution of wealth is Pareto
effïcient. It is further ahown that such gambling may well be Pazeto inefficient. The
appropriate tax~subsidy has the property that poorer individuals tend to be taxed whereas
richer individuale tend to be subeidized.1
1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The notion that an individual might caze not only about his own wealth but also
about hia relative atanding in the diatribution of wealth hae a long but checkered hiatory.
(An early exponent of such ideas was, of courae, Veblen, 1899.) It is indeed a notion which
moat economista reject, albeit uaually withont explicit comment. (A notable and azticulate
exception, however, is Frank, 1985. See also the references cited on pp. 33-34.) It is,
however, a notion with aubstantial intuitive appeal and it aeema useful to ascertain its
S
consequences before coming to a final judgement ae to ita merits.
The present paper ia concerned to derive the consequencea of such valuation of
atatua for risk taking. What seema to be the aharpeat possible model is adopted here. This
asaumes that ordinal rank in the wealth dietribution enters von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility as an azgument in addition to wealth itself. Thus higher wealth increases utility
directly but also indirectly via higher atatus. In the interesta of both aimplicity and drama,
it is asaumed that all individuals are identical and that utility is concave in wealth alone.
Section 2 presente an immediate poaitive prediction of the model- that it provides
a natural explanation of the phenomenon addresaed by Friedman and Savage (1948).
Although the typical individual here has a utility function which is concave in wealth
alone, he will, nonethelesa, engage in fair beta if winning entails moving up in status
aufficiently more rapidly than loaing entails moving down. It can be shown, for example,
that a typical diatribution of wealth, combined with separable utility, suffices to explain
the "concave-convex-concave" utility deacribed by Friedman and Savage. This
formulation has the property that the clasa of risk-preferring individuals would vazy in
terma of its abaolute wealth from country to country or over time, as is presumably
realistic.
The above discussion raises the queation of which diatributiona of wealth might be
atable in the aenae that no individual hae an incentive to take any fair bet. It ia immediate
that atability ia entailed by a density function which decreasea aufficiently rapidly. On the2
other hand, instability must equally be entailed by a density ïunction which increases
sufficiently rapidly. Distributions of wealth deacribed by continuous distribution functions
which approximate an equal diatribution are then inevitably unstable. Thia naturally
azouses the suapicion that an externality is present. The individual risk preferences here
aze indeed inappropriate from a social viewpoint. For example, an increase in the rank of a
given individual can only be accomodated at the coat of a lowering in rank of other
individuals and there is aasumed to be no compensation paid to them for this effect.
Lesa immediate properties of the model then require the investigation of the Pazeto
efficiency of various allocations of wealth acrosa individuals. This is cazried out in Section
3. There are, perhapa, some aurpriaea. If the cross-partial between wealth and atatus is
poaitive, for example, an unequal distribution of wealth maximizes the unweighted integral
of utility. (Such a welfare criterion is referred to here as Bentham-Harsanyi welfare, or
BH welfare for short.) Furihermore, although aufficiently unequal deterministic
diatributiona of wealth are Pazeto efficient, sufficiently equal distributions can be Pazeto
dominated by euitably choaen gamblea. Indeed gambles over wealth and implied atatus
assignment within the BH optimal dietribution are also Pazeto efficient. If, on the other
hand, the crosa~artial between wealth and atatua ia non-positive, an equal distribution of
wealth ia BH optimal. Now all deterministic distributions of wealth are Pazeto efficient.
However, gamblea purely over atatua within the equal diatribution aze also Pazeto eíficient.
Section 4 provides welfare and e[ficiency analysea of individually rational gambling.
It is first shown that the existence oí the externality impliea that such gambling will
decrease BH welfare when the initial distribution of wealth is Pazeto efficient. The
existence of the externality is, furthermore, ahown to imply that the following more
fundamental posaiblility can ariae. Suppose that the initial distribution of wealth is Pareto
efficient but includea a region where the denaity is increasing rapidly enough that some
individuals are riak-preferring. In thia caee, a gamble can be arranged which ia consistent
with the incentivea of the gamblers and with the incentives of the suppliers, but which is,3
neverthelees, Pareto-inefficient, due to the nncompensated statua interaction effect.
The final reault of Section 4 is to ahow how a tax~anbaidy acheme might be
employed in order that individual incentivea towazda riak would be socially appropriate. It
is ahown that a auitable taxjaubaidy hae the property that the after-tax~aubaidy marginal
ntility of wealth is the partial derivative of utility with reapect to wealth, so that the
tax~aubaidy neta out the statua effect, to firat~rder. It ia further ahown that there ia a
teadency for poorer individuala to be tazed on fair beta but for richer individuals to be
aubaidized, given that the taa~subaidy is actually paid. (Ted Bergstrom suggeats that thia
might be the reason that univeraitiea have depaztmeata of finance rather than departments
of bingo.) Thia tax~subsidy ensures that the Pareto inef5cient gambles above will not
occur.
It ia suggested that the following atrategy for a firat reading of the present paper
might be optimal. Firet read Section 2.1. Skim Section 2.2. Omit Section 3, with the
exception of Figurea 1 and 2 which ahould be looaely intelligible even in the abaence of
Propoaitiona 1 through 4. In Section 4, take it on faith that Pareto efficient initial
diatributiona can chazacterized as claimed. Finally, then, read Section 4.1, akim Section
4.2 and read Section 4.3.
2. IMMEDIATE POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS
2.1. Friedman and Savage Revidted
The phenomenon which Friedman and Savage (1948) wiah to explain ie the
simultaneous occurence of preference for risk, ae evidenced by gambling, and averaion to
riak, as evidenced by purchase of inaurance. The resolution they propoae is that the
von Neumann-Morgenatern utility be concave over an initial range of wealth, but be then
convea over a aubaequent range of wealth. ff obaervationa concerning the atructure of
prizea of lotteries are alao to be explained, there muat aleo be a final range of wealth over
which utility ia concave. It ia uaually accounted to be a defect of this theory that the
intermediate range of wealth over which utility ia conve: ahould be tied to the population4
distribution over wealth in an apparently ad hoc fashion. If individuais are supposed to be
concerned with atatue, however, auch a tie-in effect may arise naturally.
Individuals are taken to have identical von Neumann Morgenstern utility functions
given by the twice continuoualy differentiable function:
U(w,N)
where w is the wealth of the individual and N ia his atatus. Status here is taken to be the
ranking of the individual in the wealth distribution, counting from the bottom. If this
diatribution ia deacribed by a density function, this ranking is just the cumulative
diatribution function. (Section 3 describea a more general mechanism for determining
status even when there aze aeta of poaitive measure with equal wealth.) The following
restrictions aze imposed throughout on utility:
Uw(w,N) 1 0, UN(w,N) ~ 0, Uww(w,N) c 0, V w, N. (U)
The first two of theae are self~xplanatory. The third will be shown to rule out neither the
poasibility of individually rational gambling nor the aocial desirability of all gambling, but
atill servea the intereata of aimplicity.
Such a atatus motive might have an evolutionary origin. For example, the caveman
with the largeat dead mammoth might have won dinner with the cavewoman having the
moat refined table mannera, with lesa prodigious efforta rewazded with accordingly less
congenial dinner companione. This would have led to a concern about standing in the
distribution of mammoth kills transcending their inherent delectability. Indeed, if any
analogoua rewazd syatem based on wealth exiata in these more refined times, perhaps still
for intertwining the aexea, auch a concern now ia perfectly rational.
It is assumed here that what is given initially is a distribution of population over
wealth. Thia ia deacribed by a cumulative distribution function, F(.), with a continuously
differentiable denaity i(.) so that
F(w) -J
Of(w)dw, and F(W) -1,5
where the aupport of the population distribution over wealth ia [O,W] and the total
population has sise unity. It ie innocuous, indeed, to aeaume that f(w) ~ 0 on (O,W), given
the support aeaumption. It ie convenient here to take the view that the independeat
variable ia the wealth of the individual. (In the next section, when a normative view is
adopted, it will be appropriate to awitch to the name of the individuai as the independent
variable.)
Each individual' a von Neumann-Morgenatern utility can now be given in a
"reduced form" by the continously twice~ifferentiable function of wealth:
V(w) - U(w,F(w)),
The function V(.) incorporatea individual attitudea to risk when atatus can vary. Indeed
V'(w) - Uw(w,F) f UN(w,F).f(w) ~ 0
and
V"(w) - U~(w,F) ~ 2UwN(w,F).f(w) -F- U~(w,F).f(w)2 t UN(w,F).f'(w) (I)
It is then inevitable that V(.) will be locally convex (concave) whenever the population
denaity function is increasing (decreasing) rapidly enough, regardleae of the signa of the
other terma. For example, euppose that ntility ie given by the aimple additively separable
function:
U(w,N) - u(w) t~N; u'(w) ~ 0, n"(w) ~ 0, V w 1 0; u"(0) -~, u'(o) - m.
In thia case,
V"(w) - u"(w) t ~.f'(w).
If the diatribution of population over wealth ia unimodal, so that for aome m~ 0,
~ 0, for w E[ 0,m)
f' (w) - 0, for w- m
G 0, for w~ m
(D)
it followa that there is an initial and a final range of wealth anch that V ia concave. In
addition, if ~ is large enough, there will exiat an intermediate range of wealth in which V
ia convex. That is, anch a von Neumann-Morgenatern utility function can yield the riskattitudea described by Friedman and Savage. Further, any range of wealth over which V is
convex is a subset of [O,m), the range of wealth over which the population density is
increasing. That is, the range over which risk preference is exhibited ie reatricted to the
lower half of the distribution of population over wealth. (See Clotfelter and Cook, 1987, for
data suggeating that poorer individuals tend, at leaet, to spend a higher fraction of their
wealth on lotteries.) That gambling be somehow tied to the distribution of population over
wealth would seem likely to best describe data comparing countries or different periods.
2.2 Stability. Instability of Eqnal Distribntion
The above discussion of private risk-taking raises the issue of which distributions of
population over wealth might be "stable" in the sense of creating no private incentives to
take fair bets. Snch stable diatributions could be ezpected to comprise the set of long-run
equilibria when the diatribution evolves as a result of individuals who are risk-preferring
taking fair bets. (The ezplicit dynamics here seem likely to be complicated and are not
treated here.) Clearly, given the expression for V"(w) in (I) of Section 2.1, stability will
always obtain if f' (w) is amall enough. For example, if
UwN(w,N) ~ 0 and UNN(w,N) c 0, for all w, N,
it is sufficient that f'(w) ( 0 in order that V"(w) C 0 everywhere. In general,
distributions of wealth which are "pyramidal" in structure are likely to be stable in this
sense. Such a strncture is, perhaps, typical in feudal societies.
There is no guarantee that any Pazeto efficient distribution is etable in this sense, as
is esamined in detail in Section 4.2. As a simple example, consider an equal distribution of
wealth. If the cross~erivative between status and wealth is non-positive, indeed,
Proposition 2 Section 3 will show that the Bentham-Hazsanyi welfare optimum entails
such equal wealth. This is not etrictly characterized by a density function for the
distribution of population over wealth, of course. However, if a twice continuously
differentiable distribution of population were even to approach such equality, it is
inevitable that f'(w) would become arbitrarily large somewhere and gambling would occur.7
Such an equal distribution is, in this sense, inevitably unstable.
The underlying reason for such results is the presence of an extemality. That is, if a
pazticular individual moves up in the wealth diatribution, his enhanced status is obtained
at the expense of lower status for other individuals, but this interaction is assumed to be
mediated by no mazket mechanism. Similarly, if the particulaz individual moves down in
the wealth distributioa, he obtains no compensation for increasing the status of others. It
is necessary to turn to a detailed examination of eEficiency in order to derive the
chazacteristics of such an externality.
3. THE EFFICIENCY OF ALLOCATIONS OF WEALTH AND STATUS
The independent variable in all the other sections of this paper is taken to be
wealth. However, it is convenient to discuss efficiency from a formally different point of
view. Notice first that a cumulative distribution function F E C2[O,W] with a density
function strictly positive on (O,W) induces a unique distribution, w, of wealth over status
as the inverse function of F:
dw
w(F(w)) - w, dw E[O,W]; F(w(N)) - N, VN E[0,1]; dN - l~f(w(N)) ~ 0, VN E(0,1) (T)






where w' is the total (and average) level of wealth. (All integrals here are over [0,1] unless
otherwise indicated.) Thus each well-behaved distribution of population of wealth of the
type used elsewhere in the paper induces a well-behaved distribution of wealth over status.
Indeed, it is desirable to consider here a more general class of distributions of wealth over
status than those induced in this way. This permits, for example, the possibility of
equality of wealth to be treated carefully. It is also deairable to ensure that the Pareto
efficiency of a given initial well-behaved distribution of wealth is not an artifact of an
overly restricted class of redistributions. Consider then the following set of functions:Given status levels in [0,1], assign wealth levels as
w:[o,l] -, R}, w(N1) ) w(N2) VN1, N2 E[o,l], N1 ~ N2.
It is then immediate that higher wealth must be associated with
(M) higher atatus, as required. It follows that w is measurable and
bounded by w(1). Given total wealth available is w',
J
w(N)dN - w'.
Note how the above scheme permits one individual to have higher status than another even
though their wealth levels are equal. Since an arbitrarily slight difference in wealth can
lead to a given change in status, continuity requires this.
It is appropriate here to consider the name of an individual as the fundamental
independent variable. It is assumed that individuals are named in accordance with their
initial etatus in the initial well-behaved distribution of wealth. (See the statements of
Propositions 1 to 4 below.) It is necessary to consider reallocationa of status, since these
will arise from reallocations of wealth. These reallocations of atatua should, again, be
general, in order to obtain Pareto efficiency in a atrong sense.
Take then a continuum of individuals, with a typical individual named
x E [0,1].
Suppose that, altogether, individuals are first assigned status levels and then that these
status levels are asaigned wealth levels, by means of a function from the set M above.
These atatus asaignments comprise the set:
Names from the unit interval are assigned status levels, also in the unit
interval, as
(R) N : [0,1] ~ (o,l]
where N is measurable and Lebeague measure-preserving so that
d A E B[0,1], N-1(A) E B[0,1], and a{N-1(A)} - a(A)
where B[0,1] is the set of Borel subseta of [0,1] and a is Lebesgue measure.
(See Dunford and Schwaztz, 1958, p. 667.)9
Note how a function N from this aet R induces a reallocation of initial atatus, when
conaidered in conjunction with the identification of initial atatus and name. Note also how
the above complete two pazt mechanism asaigning wealth and atatua facilitates analysis of
the effect of reazranging individuals within a given wealth diatribution.
The following ia then the set of feasible deterministic utility profilea:
F-{ Y E L2[0,1] ~ Y(x) - U(w(N(x)),N(x)) for aome w E M and N E R}
(It ia convenient to use L2[0,1] here in order to be able to employ the "projection theorem"
which requirea a Hilbert space setting.) It is neceasary to allow gambles here, so recall that
the convex hull of F is
n n
co(F) -{ E ~riYi, for some n, some i ~ 0, E ai - 1, some Yi E F, i- 1,...,n}
i-1 i-1
In general, such a convex hull need not be cloaed. However, it is simpler to confine
attention to such finite gambles and it will be ahown directly that the welfaze functionals
below attain the relevant maxima on co(F).
The set of Pareto preferred profiles to a given profile Y, say, can be defined as
P(Y) - {Y E L2[0,1] ~ Y(x) ) Y(x) a.e. x E[o,l],
Y(x) ~ Y(x) on a set of positive measure}
which ia clearly also convex.
The clasa of welfaze functionals used here mainly as mathematical props aze lineaz,
given as:
S:L2[0,1] ~ R, S(Y) -
J
a(x)Y(x)dx where a E L2[0,1], a(x) ~ 0 a.e. x E[0,1].
(Note that S(Y) - c, where c E R, is the equation of a hyperplane in L2[0,1]. See
Luenberger, 1969, p. 129.) The case where a(x) - 1 will be referred to here as
Bentham-Harsanyi welfare, or BH welfaze for ahort. The associated functional will be
denoted by H.
The "welfare" problem ia then
Max S(Y) .
YECO(F)lo
Lemma 1 of the Appendix shows that Pazeto e~ciency is implied by the maximization of
any such lineaz functional. (The Appendix also discusses briefly the technical difficulties
involved in ahowing that a Pareto efficient allocation must maximize some such linear
functional.)
The following definition is a convenient shorthand in what follows:
a(x) -1~Uw(w(x),x), so that
a~ (x) - -[U~(w(x),x)w' (x) f UwN(w(x),x)]~[Uw(w(x),x)]2 (A)
for all w E Mf1C1[0,1], so that w~(x) ~ 0.
Proposition 1. Pareto Efficiency of Deterministic Wealth AUocations.
Suppose, for simplicity, that w E MnCl[0,1]. Then N(x) - x and w are Pareto
effícient in co(F) if a~ (z) ) 0, for all x E[0,1]. On the other hand, ií o:~ (x) C 0, but w~(x)
~ 0, for x in some interval, then N(x) - x and w are Pazeto inefficient in co(F).
Proof See Appendix. This proof considers a welfare functional S(Y) which uses
weights a(x) as above. The proof first shows that N(x) e x maximizes S(Y) over N E R, for
any w E M. It is then atraightforward to complete the proof of Pareto efficiency by
ahowing that w maximizes S(Y) over w E M, given N(x) - x. The proof of Pareto
inefficiency is by construction of a gamble which dominates the given allocation. This
gamble has one outcome which simply reverses atatus for individuals in the appropriate
range. This is taken in conjunction with a perturbation of the original distribution of
wealth. (See Figure 1 below.)
The following two propositions consider the role of the crose-partial of wealth and
status and exemplify the general results of Proposition 1. The BH welfare optimum is also
obtained. For simplicity, the cross-partial is taken to be uniform in sign.
Proposition 2. Pareto Efftciency and Welfare-- Positive Cross-Partial.
Supposethat
UwN(w,N) 7 0, for all w, N (PC)
Suppose, again, that w E MnCl[0,1]. In this case a~(x) ) 0, for all x E[0,1] if and only if w11
is a"sufficiently unequal" distribution of wealth over status, in this sense. Then N(x) s x
and snch w are Pareto efficient in co(F), by Proposition 1. There exists an essentially
unique unequal distribution of wealth maximizing BH welfare. All gambles over status
assignments within this 6xed distribution are also Pareto efficient in co(F). On the other
hand, a'(x) c 0 for all z E[0,1] if and only if w is a"sufficiently equal" distribution of
wealth, again in this sense. If, in additioa, w'(x) ~ 0 for any x E[0,1], N(x) - x and w are
Pazeto inefficient in co(F), by Proposition 1.
Proof See Appendix. Figure 1 represents the utility poasibility set for the case
where (PC) holds and there aze just two individuals. This diagram captures the full
intuition of the continuum case, even though it might have seemed a priorithat the
non~onvexity due to status would somehow loom lazger with a small number of agents.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The above results aze reminiscent of welfare analysis of the standard monocentric
model of a city. (See Mirrlees, 1972, for example. Mirrlees, however, rules out gambles as
being unrealistic in an urban locational model.) The next set of results reflect the
possibility of a kind of "corner solution" which seems not to have an urban economics
counterpart. .
Proposition 9. Pareto Effticiency nnd Welfare-- Non-Positive Crose-Partial.
Suppose now that
UwN(w,N) c 0, V w, N. (NC)
In this case, all distributioas of wealth w in Mf1C1[0,1] entail a'(x) ) 0, for all x E[0,1].
Hence N(x) - x and such w are Pazeto effi~ent outcomee in co(F), by Proposition 1. The
BH welfaze functional is essentially uniquely maximized by an equal diatribution of wealth.
All gambles over status, given this equal level of wealth, are also Pareto efficient.
Proof See Appendix. Figure 2 represents the utility possibility set in the case that
(NC) holds and there ate two individuals, and, again, this diagram captures the intuition
for the general case.12
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
The final result of this section concerns the circumstances in which gambling will
lead to Pazeto inefficiency. The next section shows that such gambling will quite possibly
be consistent with individuals' private attitudes to risk.
Proposition ~. Pareto Inefficiency of a Clase of Gambles.
Suppose that w E Mf1C1[0,1] is such that w'(x) ~ 0, a'(x) ~ 0, for all x E[0,1].
Hence w and N(x) a x aze Pareto efficient by Proposition 1. Suppose that Y E co(F) is
Lipshitz continuous on [0,1]. Suppose, finally, that the wealth distributions over status
involved in the construction of the finite gamble Y are, with positive probability,
essentially distiact from the original distribution w.
It follows that the gamble in co(F) which yields expected utility
~rU(w(x),x) f(1-a)Y(x), for each x E[0,1],
is strictly Pareto dominated in co(F) for all a E(0,1).
Proof See Appendix. Figure 2 gives the geometric intuition for this result when
(NC) holds. The intuition when (PC) holds is similaz.
The resulta of this section aet the stage íor the more positive discussion of the next.
4. WELFARE AND EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF PRIVATE GAMBLING
Note, as a remazk that applies throughout Section 4, that whether or not there exist
risk-preferring individuals is logically independent oí whether or not the initial distribution
is Pareto efficient. This follows from Section 3 since the function a'(x), from (A), does not
depend on f'(w(x)), given (T), whereas the sign of a'(x) determines Pazeto efficiency, as in
Proposition 1. It is also assumed throughout that Pazeto ef5ciency of each distribution is
evaluated in conjunction with the status assignment N(x) e x, as in the statement of
Proposition 1.
4.1 Welfare Effecte
It is now shown that simply banning individually rational gambling, as introduced
in Section 2, could not lower Bentham-Hazsanyi welfare given a Pareto efficient initial13
determiniatic distribution of wealth. Of courae, such a ban would generally reduce the
expected utility of the erstwhile gamblers and then would not be Pareto improving. BH






where the notation is as in Section 2. (Thia is the obvioue analogue of the additive
criterion propoaed by Harsanyi, 1955, with the additional requirement of aymmetry over
the identical individuals.) Suppose that the appro~mately f(w)6 individuals having initial
wealth in the interval ~,wfóf engage in a fair bet, so that final wealth is in the interval
[w,wtb], where Ew - w. (It is not hard to show how amall approximately fair bets can be
aupplied by the total population with the judicioua use of risk "discounts" and premiums.
Theae can be shown to have effecta on H which aze of second order in é. The next
aubaection carriea out auch a conatruction for a more delicate situation.) The effects on H
concern the utility of individuala who gamble and that of individuals whose etatus is
affected by the gamble. Thua the change in H, for each poasible value of w, ia given to
first~rder in 6 as
( ) r ~H w
--U(w,F(~) f U(w,F(w)) -
Jw
UN(w,F(w))f(w)dw, where Ew - w.
f(w)6 w
The third term here is the uncompensated effect of the externality. Integrating by parts,
rw




The following relationship between ~r and a, as in (A) of Section 3, is then immediate:
~~ - 0~ ~'(w) - Uw(w,F(w)) - lIn{F(w)) ~ ~,
aign ~r"(w) --sión a'(F(w)).
Clearly, then, Jensen'e inequality impliea that, to first order in 6,
E~H(w) ~ 0, for all beta w, if a'(F(w)) ~ 0, for all w? 0;14
EOH(w) ~ 0, for small enough beta w, if a'(F(~) c 0.
Suppose the initial distribution is Pazeto efficient, as in Proposition 1, so that a'(x) ~ 0,
for all x E[0,1]. The intuitive reason that auch a gamble then generally cannot increase
expected welfare is as follows. Such Pazeto efficient distributions aze those which aze no
more equal than the BH optimum. The gamble here yields an outcome which is still more
unequal in a straightforwazd mean-preserving spread sense, and so generally decreases
welfare. On the other hand, Proposition 1 also shows that, if a'(x) ia negative anywhere,
then the associated twice continuously differentiable distribution is Pareto inefficient.
Small gambles in the same region will now increase welfare. The intuitive reason for the
difference is that Pazeto inefflcient diatributions aze locally too equal rather than too
unequal.
4.2. IneEfiicient Pávate Gambling
This subsection constructa a clasa of examples in which Pareto inefficient gambling,
of the type preaented in Proposition 4, is consistent with individual attitudes to risk.
Demonatrating that auch inefsciency is posaible is the heart of the matter in chazacterizing
an externality. Accordingly, aome caze is taken in showing how small approximately fair
bets can be aupplied.
Suppose, indeed, that the approximately f(~Ó individuals in the wealth interval
[w-b2,wfó~-ó2) aze strictly risk-preferring. There must then exist a fair bet as follows.
For each dollaz bet, the groas return ie b, say, where E(b) - 1. All these individuals will
take as much of this fair bet as possible. There muat indeed exiat a risk "discount", i, say,
such that the bet which yielda final wealth wb - i is preferred by all individuals in ~,wf b]
to remaining at w for sure, for small enough i~0. In order to apply Proposition 4, it must
be auppoaed that the random variable b has a finite number of realizations. Indeed, for
aimplicity, asaume there aze juat two so that
b- bl ~ 1, with probability x E(0,1), and b- b2 c 1, with probability 1-a E(0,1).
It is also required that expected utility, Y(x), say, of each individual, x, is Lipshitz in x.15
This can be accomplished as follows. Define an exogenoua deterministic "pazticipation"
function as
p:[O,W] ~ [0,1] auch that
p(w) - 1 Vw E[w,w~ó], p(w) - 0 V w~(w-62 ,wtbfó2),
which is piecewise lineaz, as in Figure 3. Define also a risk discount function r(w), say,
such that
r(w) - 0 Vw ~ (w,w-Fó); r(wtó~2) - r
which is also piecewiae lineaz as in Figure 3.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
It follows that all individuals in the initial wealth interval ~-ó2,wfótó2] would take the
bet yielding final wealth as the random variable
(1-p(w))w f p(w)wb - r(w) - w t p(w)w(b-1) - r(w)
rather than remain at w for aure. Asaume now that ë is amall enough that the functions
wl(w) - w t p(w)w(bi1) - r(w) and w2(w) - w} p(w)w(b2 1) - r(w)
aze of the form aketched in Figure 3. In particular, the derivative of each of these functions
hae the aign as indicated and this ia bounded away from zero, wherever it exists. The final
wealth of an individual of initial name and statua x ia then
wi(w(x)) i - 1, 2
where w is the initial distribution of wealth over statua function, w E C2[0,1], w' (x) ~ 0,
for all x E[0,1]. The functiona wi(w(.)), i-1,2, aze clearly Lipshitz. The final status of an
individual with initial name and status x ia given as the continuous function
Ni(x) -.~{z ~ wi(w(z)) C wi(w(x)) } for i- 1, 2,
where a is Lebesgue measure. Given the functions wi as conatructed, it follows that the set
involved here consists of at most three closed subintervals of [0,1]. Each endpoint of such a
subinterval correaponds to a value of x with the same image under Ni. These endpoints are
of the form
xj(wi(w(x))) for j- 1,...,J, and i- 1, 2, where xj'(wi) -[wi'(w(xj)).w'(zj)]-116
for all except a finite number of values of x. The derivative of wi, where it exista, is
bounded away from zero, so that the derivative of each of these endpoints with respect to
final wealth is bonnded, where it e.xista. Recalling that each wi(w(.)) i-1,2 is Lipshitz, it
followa that Ni is also Lipshitz. Hence Y(.) is Lipahitz, as required.
Suppose the other eide of the gamble is apread evenly across the total population.
(I;.eCall th18 h88 Blze uIIlty.) Suppose that an individual with wealth w is paid a risk
premium of s(w) so that he ia indifferent to the gamble. (It is possible that
s(w) G 0, if this individual ia himaelf riskpreferring.) That is,
EV[w - 6f(~w(b-1) i- a term in b~ f s(w)] - V(w),
which implies that s(w) is of second-order in b. It needa to be shown that these required
riak-premiuma can be supplied from the riak-discounts paid by the gamblers. However,
this follows immediately if b is small enough because then
J
O s(w)f(w)dw C J
O r(w)f(w)dw - if(~b~2 -F a term in b2.
Such a gamble is then consiatent with all the pertinent private attitudes to risk.
Note that the distribution of wealth over status after the gamble is clearly generally
different from that before. Suppose the initial Pareto efficient distribution is as in the
statement of Proposition 4. Propoaition 4 then implies that a"compound gamble"
involving this initial distribution and the gamble constructed above must be Pareto
inefficient, if the probability of attaining the original distribution is positive but less than
1. This completes the description of the desired class of Pazeto inefficient gambles.
4.3. Taua and Snbsidies.
Consider now the possibility of addreasing the externality by means of a suitable
tax~aubaidy scheme. Suppose that the scheme treats the original deterministic distribution
as a zero point and doea not rediatribute wealth in the absence of gambling. Consider
indeed the following tax~subaidy on an individual of initial wealth w17
w UN(w, F(w) ) f (w)
t(w) dw, so that t(~ - 0
- w Uw w,F w
The numerator of the integrand here represents the rate of uncompensated loss of utility
due to loss of status caused by an individual moving up in wealth. The denominator will
be proved to be the after-tax~subsidy mazginal utility of wealth for individuals affected by
the move. (That is, assuming these individuals are taxed~subsidized in exactly the fashion
to be derived here for the gambler.) Define the following
R(w) - wealth retained by the individual when lottery pays w, so R(w~ - w,
t(R(w)) - T(w) - tax paid when final wealth attained is R(w), so that
w - t(R(w)) - R(w)
It follows that
R (w) - 1 - Uw ( R ~ F ( R ) ) E (~,1)
lft' R~f Uw R,F R t UN R,F R R
dropping w as the argument of R(.) for expositional clarity. What determines whether an




B'(w) -{Uw(R,F(R)) t UN(R,F(R))f(R)}R'(w) - Uw(R,F(R)) - l~a(F(R)),
where a is as in (A) of Section 3. It follows that the after-tax marginal utility at w ia
indeed simply Uw(w,F(w)), as claimed above. It also follows that
sign B"(w) -~ign a'(F(R(w))), for all w~ 0.
Hence all fair gambles are (without loss of generality) rejected when the initial distribution
of wealth is Pazeto efficient, as in Proposition 1, and so satisfies a'(x) ~ 0, for all x. On
the other hand, if the initial distribution of wealth is not Pareto efficient as in Proposition
1, so that a' (x) c 0 for some x, it follows that some small fair gambles will be accepted.
Hence the imposition of such a taz~subsidy, without loss of generality, rules out the Pazeto18
inefficient gambles as constructed in Section 4.2, or indeed any generalization still
involving the taking of fair bets given an initial Pazeto efficient distribution.
It is interesting to derive the incidence of a gambling taz~subsidy on a small fair
bet, although the above discussion proves that actual payments aze not generally made
when the initial distribution is Pareto effitient and the tax~subsidy is full as above. It is
not hazd to show that
T (w) - t , , ( R ) ( 1-R' ( w ) ] ~ and T„(~ - t ' ' ( w ) [ 1-R' ( w ) ]
[ltt'(R)]2 [ltt'(w)]2
It now follows from the expression for t(w) that the sign of T' '(~ is then determined by
the sign oí f' (~ if this ie lazge in absolute value. That ie, given the usual distribution of
population over wealth, as in (D) of Section 2.1, there will be a tendency for T' '(~ to be
positive for poorer individuals and negative for richer individuals. Cleazly
~ )
E[T(w)] T[Ew] - T~] - 0 according to T"[w~ 0,
G ~
for small fair bets with final wealth w. It follows that there is a tendency for poorer
individuals to be tazed on small bets and for richer individuals to be subsidized. Clotfelter
and Cook (1987) azgue that the actual incidence of the implicit taxation associated with
state lotteries is regressive. The present paper shows that such regressivity need not be as
inappropriate as it might seem at first blush.
For example, suppose that utility is given as





~ u, , (W) ) f , (w)
t"(~ ~ 0 iff ~
u'(w) f(w)
Hence, in particular, all individuals with wealth lesa than the mode, m, are taxed. On thels
other hand, individuals with wealth above the mode, m, will be subsidized when the
elasticity of mazginal utility with respect to wealth is lesa in absolute value than the
elasticity of the density with respect to wealth.
5. CONCLUSIONS
As noted in Section 2.2, it might be of intereat to model the dynamics of the
evolution of the distribution when individuala, who want to do so, take gambles which the
remainder of the population aze willing to supply. This would seem likely to be a complex
task in the preaent setting with a continuum of individuals.
Two restrictions imposed in the present paper were that that all individuale were
identical and that utility was concave in wealth alone. These certainly aerve the purpose of
dramatizing the aubatantial difference that a concern with status might make. However, it
would be useful to relax these assumptions.
Note finally that the obaervationa here concerning gambling undoubtedly have
counterparta concerning inaurance. Perhaps, for example, richer individuala tend to be too
risk-averse and then to insure too much. This analyaia might well require exogenoua
wealth uncertainty and is left for future reseazch.
6. APPENDIX
Recall the restrictions imposed on the utility function as in (U), the seta of atatus
and wealth asaignment functions, R and M, the set of utility profiles obtainable with finite
gamblea, co(F), and the definition of Pareto preference, P(Y), all as given in Section 3.
Armed with these the following reault is immediate.
Lemma 1




where a E L2[0,1] and a(x) ~ 0 a.e. x E[0,1]. It followe that Y' is Pazeto efficient in
co(F).20
Proof Suppose not, so that there exists
Y E P(Y')flco(F).
It is then cleaz that
f n{x)Y'(x)dx c I n{x)Y(x)dx o
Comment It is not trivial to eatablish a converse to the above result. (Such a converse
might yield an alternative method of proving that certain allocations are not Pazeto
efficient.) The basic di~culty is that the set of feasible utility profiles, co(F), and each
Pareto preferred set, P(Y), have empty interiors in L2[0,1], so that the separating
hyperplane theorem cannot be applied. (See Luenberger, 1969, p. 133, for example.)
Whereas Mas--Colell (1986) successfully establishes a sepazation result in the absence of
this hypothesis, this was for a problem with an infinite number of commodities rather than
an infinite number of agents. The additional restrictions on technology and preferences he
imposed seem not to have immediate analogues here.
The following Lemma is useful in deriving the proof of Theorem 1 which
characterizes an optimal solution for the status assignment function, N.
Lemma 2
Consider the linear programming problem:
n
Max E a.b .x. .
{xij}i,j-1 1 ] ~]
subject to
n n
x.. ~ 0, E x.. - E x.. - 1, for all i,j,
1] - i-1 1] j-1 1]
where also
O~alCa2~...Can, and Ocblcb2~...~bn
Then the following is always a solution:
xij - 0, for all i~ j
- 1, for all i- j21
Proof Suppose that i is the first indez such that
xli~l.
Clearly there exist j, k~ i such that
xij 1 0 and x~ ~ 0.
Take
e - Min{xij,x~} ~ 0
and define x' a8
xii - xii t E, xi~ - xij - E, xk~ - x~ - e, xk~ - xkj f E
and elsewhere equal to x. It ia clear that the change induced in the objective function is
then 0, say, where
D~e - aibi - aibj - akbi f akbj -( ak - ai)(bj - bi) ~ 0.
After a 5nite number of steps, this yields
xii-1.
Then the entire procesa can be repeated, to obtain finally that
n n
E a.b.x.. t E a.b. o.
i,j-1
i ~ i~ - i-1 1 i
The following chazacterization of an optimal status assignment is now immediate:
Theorem 1
Suppose that m~ a{1), u(0) ~ 0, ~(xl) ~ o{x2), for all xl, x2 E[0,1], xl ~ x2. It
follows that
f a{x)U(w(N(x)),N(x))dx C ~ a(x)U(w(x),x)dx
for any w E M and N E R, where the sets M and R were defined in Section 3. That is, if
the weights ~(x) are non~ecreasing in x, aetting N(x) - x never decreases the welfare
functional, regazdless of w E M.
Proof Define, for compactnesa of notation,
y(N) - U(w(N),N)
so that y(.) is then a atrictly increasing function. Suppose, contrary to the assertion of the2z




for some e~ 0. Consider the simple function
Nk(x) - iJk if N(x) E((i-1)Jk,iJk] - Ik, say, i- 2,...,k and
Nk(x) - 1Jk if N(x) E[O,1Jk] - Ii,
say. It followa that from the Lebeague dominated convergence theorem that there exists an
integer K such that
f a(x)Y(Nk(x))dx ~ f~(x)Y(x)dx -}- eJ2, for all k~ K, (~)
since the functions N, y, andJ a aze all bounded. Define now
Ak - N1(Ik) so that .1(Ak) - a(Ik) - 1Jk, for i - 1,...,k,
and the {Ak}ikl form a partition of I-[0,1], given that N belongs to the set R. Define
also
Bkj - AkftI~ , and aij - a(Bij) ~ 0,
n n
E a. .- E a. .- 1Jk, íor all i,j.
i-1 1~ j-1 ~~
JBk a(x)dx ( ~jJk)~ij
t~
so that the LHS of (') satisfiea
k k k r k k
LHS - E y(iJk) I k rr(x)dx - E y(iJk) E
J
k a{x)dx S,E Y(iJk) E n{jJk) ai..
i-1 Ai i-1 j-1 Bij i-1 j-1 ~
Applying Lemma 2, it follows then that
k
LHS C E (1Jk)y(iJk)n(iJk)
- i-1
Since a and y aze monotonic and bounded, their product ia Riemann integrable. Hence
k r r
li m E(1Jk)y(iJk)n(iJk) -J
a(x)y(x)dx 1J
a(x)y(x)dx f eJ2. o
kym i-1
The next reault is required in the proofs of the Propositions to follow.23
Lemma 8
Suppose that m~ a(1), a(0) ~ 0, a(xl) ) a(x2) for all xl, x2 E[0,1],




is essentially unique in the class M.
Proof Suppose then that wl and w2 belong to M and aze essentially different.
(That is, wl and w2 difíer on a set of posítive measure.) Suppose that wl and w2 are each
used with positive probability in solutions of the above problem. It follows from Theorem




w(E,x) - EWl(x) ~ (1-E)w2(X)
also belongs to M. However, it is clear from Jenaen's inequality, given the concavity of U
in w, that w(1~2,x), for example, is a strict improvement as a solution over either wl or
w2, which is the desired contradiction.
Proof ofProposition 1
Suppoae that a'(x) ) 0, for all x E[0,1]. It will be ahown that




which implies that the given pair of functions also constitute a solution in co(F). It follows
that w is Pareto efficient, by Lemma 1. Suppose indeed that w E M and N E R are any
other feasible pair of functions. Define
w(E,X) - (1-E)w(x) -F EW(X)
which also cleazly belongs to M. If
S(E) - J a(x)U(w(E,x),x)dX24
then it is easily ehown that S(.) is twice continuously differentiable and
S'(0) - 0, S"(e) ~ 0, for all e E[0,1], so that S(0) ~ S(1).
Theorem 1 can now be applied to yield
S(0) - I a(x) U(w(x),x)dx ~ S(1) - r a(x)U(w(x),x)dx ~ I n(x)U(w(N(x)),N(x))dx o
Suppoae now that n'(x) C 0, buJt w'(x) ) 0, for all x E[a,b] s I' C[0,1], where
a ~ b. As a first etep, conaider the hyperplane which is the orthogonal complement of the
subspace generated by a
{h E L2[a,b]~ fI ~(x)h(x)dx - 0} - L,
say. Consider also the element of L2[a,b.l] which represents the change in utility azising
from a complete reversal of atatus within the distribution w on I':
U(w(o(x)),a(z)) - U(w(x),x) - ~U(x), say, where o(x) - a f b-x, for a11 x E[a,b].





I n{x)~U(x)dx ~ 0
since this integral is the "covariance" between two strictly decreasing functions.
It followa from the "projection theorem" (Luenberger, 1969, pp. 51~3) that
AU(x) - pn{z) f h(x)
for some p~ 0 and h E L. Indeed, since a and ~U are continuously differentiable, it
follows that h is also.
Define then the following gamble in co(F). Leave all individuata x~ I' with wealth
w(x) for aure. Otherwiae, with probability 1-c asaign an individual x E I' status x and
wealth
w(x) - E~(x)h(x) - w(x), say, where E is auch that w'(x) ~ 0, for all x E[0,1].
Such a wealth distribution ia feasible aince h E L. With remaining probability e give each
individual x E I' atatus a{x) and wealth w(o{x)). Hence expected utility for each25
individual x E I~ is given by, say,
V(E,x) - (1-E)U[w(x}--ED:(x)ll(x),x] f EU[W(O(]C)),O(7C)]
80 tLat
VE(O,x) - U[w(o(x)),a(z)] - U[w(a),x] - Uw[w(x),x]a(x)h(x)
- ~U(x) - h(x) -~(x) 1 0, for all x E[a,bJ.
Given that V(E,x) is continuonsly twice differentiable, it is not hazd to ahow that there
must exist an é such that the above gamble yielde a strict improvement in expected utility,
for every individual in [a,b], for all e E[o,~. (See Figure 1 for the geometric intuition for
this construction, based on the two-peraon case.)
ProofofPropoaition 2
All that remains to consider is Bentham-Harsanyi case where
ct(x) e 1, for all x E[0,1].
Given Theorem 1 and Lemma 3, there cleazly now eusts an essentially unique optimal
wealth diatribution, wH, say. Indeed, it is easily seen to satisfy
Uw(wH(x),x) - a, a.e., for some a 1 0, so that dwH ( x) 1 0, given (PC),
~
assuming that wH(x) ~ 0 a.e. Hence wH is a necessarily unequal distribution of wealth. It
can be shown that arbitrazy N E R are now also optimal, by a proof similaz to that of
Theorem 1. Hence gambles over statns within the given wealth distribution wH are also
Pareto e~áent as claimed.
Proof ofProposition 8





Suppose indesd that w E M is distinct from the oonstant function w' on a set of positive
measure. Define
W(E,Z) -(1-E)W~ ~ EW(x) E M 8IId S(E) - J U(W(E,Z)r7C)dx,26
where S(.) is clearly twice continuously differentiable. It follows that
S'(~) - J UW(w',x)[w(x}-w']dz ~ 0,
since w(x) is a aon-decreasing function, Uw(w~,x) is an non-increasing function and
J
w(x)dx - w~`,
so that S'(0) ie the "covariance" between w(a) and UW(w',x). In addition,





Again, it can be shown that any N E R is optimal here. Thns the equal wealth




L-{h E L2[0,1] ~ f a(x)h(x)dx - 0}.
Given that Y E co(F) and entails wealth distributions functions essentially dietinct from w,
it follows from Theorem 1, Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 that, if
~U(x) - Y(x) - U(w(x),x), then
J
a(x)DU(x)dx C 0.
From the "projection theorem" (Luenberger, 1969, pp.51-á3), it follows that
DU(x) - -{~a(x) f h(x)
for some p 1 0 and h E L. Since a and w are continuonsly differentiable, and Y is Lipshitz,
h is Lipshitz. Since indeed, w' (x) 1 0, for all x E[0,1], it is then possible to choose E 1 0
small enough that
w(x) - w(x) f Ea(x)h(x)~~r is monotoaically increasing, for all x E~0,1].
This is then a feasible redistribution of wealth over statns, given that h E L. Conaider then
the following perturbation of the original gamble:
V(E,7C) - (Z~E)U(W(Z)j-EQ(x)h(x),1f,x) f (1-7r E)Y(X).
It follows that27
VE(O,x) - Uw(w(z),x)n{x)h(x) t U(w(x),x) - Y(x)
- h(x) - ~U(x) - pn(x) ~ 0, for all x E[0,1].
Since V(e,x) is continuously twice differentiable, it is not then hazd to see that the
constructed gamble is indeed Pazeto preferred to the given gamble, for all small enough e,
as was to be shown. (See Figure 2.)
It is easily seen that the above proof can be generalized to cover a gamble Y which
need have only one component Yi, say, which need be only Lipshitz continuous from below
in the sense that
Yi(xl) - Yi(x2) ~-k(xl - x2) Vxl, x2 E[0,1], xl ~ x2, for some k~ 0.
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